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Abstract
We consider a market where privately informed sellers resort to certification
to overcome adverse selection. There is uncertainty about the certifier’s ability to
generate accurate information. The profit of a monopolistic certifier is an inverted
U-shaped function of his reputation for accuracy: being perceived as more precise
allows to attract more good sellers but a high expected precision also deters
bad sellers. Since the certifier tries to reach a balanced reputation to attract
both types, reputation has a disciplining effect when the certifier is perceived
as insufficiently accurate, but gives incentives to decrease precision when he is
perceived as “too” accurate. The impact of competition depends on whether
sellers “multihome” or “singlehome”. Under singlehoming, certifiers compete to
attract good sellers, which makes higher reputation more valuable. Multihoming
makes higher reputations less desirable because the competitor exerts a negative
externality by providing extra information. Therefore, singlehoming attenuates
bad reputation effects, while multihoming exacerbates inefficiencies.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal contribution, Akerlof (1970) shows how asymmetric information may
result in market breakdown. In markets plagued by adverse selection, certification
mechanisms play a critical role: by providing a third-party opinion, certifiers breach
the informational gap between buyers and sellers and contribute to restore market
functioning. Some markets could actually not exist absent certifiers. In January 2011,
the final report of the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) emphasized
that “without the active participation of the rating agencies, the market for mortgage-
related securities could not have been what it became.” The central role of certifiers
is reinforced by regulations that rely on their seal of approval.1 However, because
certifiers are themselves subject to incentive problems, they are not a panacea for
adverse selection problems. The unfolding of the financial crisis from 2008 suggests
that, far from improving market efficiency, rating agencies have been instrumental in
a massive misallocation of capital.2 While the well-known conflict of interests that
issuer-paid rating agencies face has been under heavy fire since 2009, a report from
the Security and Exchange Commission in September 2011 still casts doubt on their
incentives to provide unbiased information.3
In this paper, we investigate a central incentive mechanism for certifiers: reputation.
Reputational concerns have been a central defense of rating agencies against accusations
of conflict of interest and misaligned incentives. In the words of Thomas McGuire,
former executive vice-president of Moody’s, “what’s driving us is primarily the issue
of preserving our track record. That’s our bread and butter.”4 However, as Mark
Froeba, former senior vice-president of Moody’s, suggests, rating agencies have striven
1For instance, under the Basel II regulation, banks can use credit ratings from approved agencies
in the derivation of their capital requirements. The SEC also uses ratings for the regulation of broker-
dealers.
2The same report from the FCIC states: “We conclude the failures of credit rating agencies were
essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction. The three credit rating agencies were key enablers
of the financial meltdown.”
3See for instance: “SEC critical of rating agency’s controls,” Financial Times, September 30, 2011.
See also Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Hund (2011), which provides empirical evidence suggesting a
systematic bias of rating agencies towards issuers that generate a higher turnover.
4Quoted by Becker and Milbourn (2011).
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in the same breath to develop a reputation for being business-friendly as well: “This
was a systematic and aggressive strategy to replace a (...) getting-the-rating-right
kind of culture with a culture that was supposed to be “business-friendly”, but was
consistently less likely to assign a rating that was tougher than our competitors.”5 The
essence of the business of credit ratings agencies is therefore to humour both parties,
by displaying leniency to issuers without jeopardizing the confidence of investors. Of
course, in a rational model, it is not possible to run with the hare and hunt with the
hounds. Certifiers must accordingly find a compromise between these two goals, and
this is precisely what we aim at describing here.
We formalize the idea that reputation is essentially two-sided for certifiers and
examine incentives to build up a reputation in this context. We first develop a static
model in which the certifier’s profit is maximum when he his perceived as neither
too accurate nor too inaccurate: being perceived as more accurate allows to attract
more good sellers, who have nothing to hide and prefer certification to be as credible
as possible; but being perceived as “too accurate” in the same time discourages bad
sellers, who are less likely to obtain certification. As a result, the certifier would ideally
like to achieve a ‘balanced” reputation for accuracy.
In this context, we show that the direction of reputational incentives depends on
the current reputation of the certifier: when perceived as insufficiently accurate, the
certifier tries to build a reputation for more accuracy, and increases the precision of
his signal accordingly; otherwise, a certifier with a high reputation is concerned with
being perceived as too precise and hence decreases the precision of the information
he provides to signal he is (bad) seller-friendly. In terms of welfare, reputation can
therefore be welfare-increasing (“discipline”), by sometimes inducing the certifier to
be more precise than in the static case; but it is welfare-decreasing otherwise (“bad
reputation”), as it then provides incentives to decrease the quality of the information
provided to the market.
Finally, we examine the impact of competition, which we model as entry threat:
the incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry of a second certifier with unknown
5“How Moody’s sold its ratings - and sold out investors”, McClatchy Newspapers, Oct. 19, 2009.
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reputation. We first focus on the case where the seller can only be certified by a single
certifier (“singlehoming”).In this market structure, only the more reputable certifier is
active. Intuitively, even though a lower reputation for accuracy sometimes increases
the popularity of a certifier vis-a`-vis bad sellers, a certifier faces no demand unless he
attracts good sellers. Since the latter have an unambiguous preference for accuracy,
they flock to the more reputable certifier. As a result, a certifier is all the less likely to
face entry as his reputation is high and the incumbent’s profit is maximized for a bliss
reputation higher than in the monopoly case. It follows from this shift in the profit
function that competition attenuates bad reputation effects: a monopolist certifier who
decreases precision for reputational motives would provide more precise information if
he were under the threat of entry. Second, we analyze “multihoming,” that is, the
possibility for the seller to solicit certification from more than one certifier. This prac-
tice is commonplace for credit ratings: Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoff, and Seppi (2009)
report that the overwhelming majority of large corporate bond issues have at least two
ratings.6 We abstract from the issue of rating shopping and assume that applications
for certification are publicly observed.7 We first show that, provided that the cost of an
extra certifier is sufficiently small, the seller asks for two ratings or none in equilibrium.
The presence of multihoming impacts certifiers’ preferences over their own reputations
in a dramatically different way from singlehoming: each certifier’s bliss reputation is
lower under multihoming than under monopoly. Intuitively, the size of the total mar-
ket for certification is maximal when the certification process is neither too precise nor
too imprecise; the presence of a second certifier who produces an independent signal
increases the precision of the process everything else equal. A certifier with an ideal
reputation under monopoly is now too accurate, because of the externality exerted by
the competitor. To compensate for this additional information, each certifier would
like to be perceived as less accurate than in the monopoly case (and less so the more
reputable the other certifier). A consequence is that multihoming exacerbates bad rep-
6In their sample of 8,767 bonds taken from the Barclays Capital Bond Index, 99.5% of bond issues
are rated by S&P and Moody’s and 70% are rated by Fitch.
7Rating shopping refers to the possibility for issuers to secretly apply for several ratings and pick
the most favorable one. See among others Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and ?.
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utation effects: a certifier who would decrease precision for reputational motives if it
were a monopoly provides even less precise information under the threat of entry.
While rating agencies constitute a natural illustration of our framework and an ex-
ample we use repeatedly in the paper, the analysis applies to any certification market
in which certifiers care about the size of their customer base and issuers may hold
certifications from several certifiers at the same time. Examples of such market include
financial audit, technical standards (e.g., ISO, CEN), school accreditations (e.g., EQ-
UIS, AACSB) or individual proficiency tests (e.g., GMAT, GRE, TOEIC). Hence, this
paper belongs to the literature on the reputation and credibility of experts.
This paper belongs to the literature on the reputation and credibility of experts.
After Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet
(2009) have shown that reputation has a disciplining effect but is not sufficient to ensure
truthful information transmission. As most papers on reputation in the literature,
these papers are based on a trade-off between short-term incentives to manipulate
information in order to inflate short-term profits and long-term incentives to build
up a reputation. By contrast, we show that, even in the absence of an immediate
reward from information manipulation, reputation itself can lead a certifier to decrease
the quality of information. Therefore, reputation can be “bad”, i.e. welfare-reducing,
while it is welfare-enhancing in those two papers.8 Another stream of papers investigate
conditions under which reputation may have an adverse effect on welfare (Morris, 2001;
Ely and Va¨lima¨ki, 2003; Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine, 2008). In these papers, some types
try to separate themselves from other types with an intrinsic motivation to misbehave,
which cripples their incentives to behave. On the contrary, in our model, the certifier
distorts the quality of information because he wants to develop a reputation for being
what would be the “bad type” in these models. Finally, our paper is related to models of
reputation with multiple audiences. In particular, Frenkel (2010) studies a model where
a rating agency tries to develop two reputations, one public and one private. Bar-Isaac
8Another difference with Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009)
is that our model features adverse selection in the product market, while they assume that sellers do
not have any informational advantage over buyers.
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and Deb (2012) study a general framework where an agent tries to develop a reputation
vis-a`-vis several audiences.9 We differ from their paper by focussing especially on the
issue of information transmission in certification markets. This allows us to derive
qualitative insights on the impact of competition (singlehoming and multihoming) in
these markets.
2 The model
2.1 The market
We consider a setup with three categories of risk neutral players: a seller, buyers and
a certifier. The seller owns a product of quality θ ∈ {θg, θb}, where Pr(θ = θg) = β,
and θ is private information of his. There is a continuum of competitive buyers with
valuation 1 for a high-quality product (θ = θg) and 0 for a low-quality product (θ = θb).
The seller has a reserve price λ for a good product, where λ is a continuous random
variable with density f and a log-concave cumulative distribution F onR+.
10 Therefore,
there are gains from trade for realizations of λ smaller than 1. When product quality
is public information, only high-quality products are traded. However, since the seller
is privately informed about his good, there is adverse selection. For simplicity, we
focus on the extreme case where adverse selection precludes any trade in the absence
of additional information. Specifically, we assume:
Assumption 1. β < β0 ≡ min
P∈[0,1]
P
P+(1−P )F (P ) .
11
Consider a candidate price P at which the seller could sell his good to buyers. A
high-quality seller is willing to sell at price P if and only if λ ≤ P . Hence, condi-
tional on the seller being of high quality, the probability that he sells is F (P ). Bad
sellers are willing to sell at any price P ≥ 0. Buyers are willing to pay at most the
9See also Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988) and Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) on sig-
nalling to multiple audiences.
10We assume that the realization of λ is privately observed by the seller as well.
11Note that we need to impose that F is differentiable at 0 to get that PP+(1−P )F (P ) is bounded
away from 0 for P ∈ [0, 1].
5
expected value of the product conditional on the seller being willing to sell, that is,
βF (P )
βF (P )+(1−β) . Assumption 1 ensures that this expected value is strictly smaller than P
for any P ∈ (0, 1], which implies that the market does not have a positive equilibrium
price. Intuitively, when the probability of a low-quality seller is sufficiently high (β
is low), adverse selection drives all high-quality buyers out of the market, which then
collapses. We focus on certification as a way to alleviate adverse selection. Our setting
is therefore meant to capture any market where sellers resort to certification agencies
or standard-setting organizations (Lerner and Tirole, 2006; Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole,
2008). A possible application is the bond market: a bank willing to securitize assets
for diversification or liquidity motives issues bonds backed by mortgages, while these
bonds are bought by mutual or pension funds who seek exposure the the real estate
market.12 In this market, credit rating agencies play a fundamental role by providing
information on the issuer’s credit risk.
2.2 The certification process
The certifier is endowed with a technology which produces a signal σ ∈ {∅, b} on
the quality of the product, with conditional distributions Pr(σ = ∅|θ = θg) = 1 and
Pr(σ = b|θ = θb) = α + e. The precision of the certifier’s signal depends both on
an enduring technological parameter α ∈ {αL, αH} and on some unobservable effort
e ∈ [−ε, ε] that the certifier exerts, where ε < min {αL, 1− αH} . Effort e is allowed
to be negative and involves a cost 1
2
ce2: while increasing the precision of the signal
takes extra effort and resources, decreasing the precision might require destroying or
falsifying the information that enters the signal-generating process, or might expose
the certifier ex post to the risk of lawsuits or regulatory sanctions. This specification
allows to capture the idea that the certifier may be willing to pay to decrease his
precision for reputational motives, as will be shown below.13 Notice that a signal σ = b
12Interpreting sellers as financial institutions is consistent with them being “sophisticated” market
participants, having superior information about the quality of their product.
13We assume here costly negative effort, but could alternatively assume an intrinsic preference for
truthtelling which induces the certifier to exert positive effort even in the absence of reputational
concerns. We would then compare the level of effort with reputational concerns to this benchmark
effort level, while, in our specification, effort always equals 0 in the benchmark case of no-reputation.
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provides perfect evidence that the product is of bad quality, while perfect evidence of
high quality is never available.14 We interpret σ as the certification outcome: if σ = ∅,
the product is said to be certified; when σ = b, the seller’s application is rejected.
While effort is private information of the certifier, the signal σ is publicly observed.
Therefore, the certifier affects the ex ante precision of the signal through costly effort,
but cannot manipulate the signal ex post. This specification of information production
is in the spirit of Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), who model
a a game of persuasion in which a sender commits to disclose the signal he produces but
can ex ante choose the distribution of the signal. Note however that in these models,
the structure of the signal can be adjusted at no cost and is public information, while
adjustments are costly and unobservable in our model.15 This captures the idea that
(costly) manipulations of the technology are more difficult to detect than manipulations
of the signal produced itself.16
Finally, we assume that certification involves a fixed cost φ for the seller. This cost
consists of a fixed and upfront fee paid to the certifier, zφ, and of additional costs,
(1 − z)φ, related to information production and product design.17 For instance, fi-
nancial claims may have to be repackaged and distributed to institutional investors,
which requires the services of a range of financial intermediaries. Importantly, since the
certifier is paid upfront, he has no direct incentive to make any (positive or negative)
effort to change his precision, while a report-contingent payment would create incen-
tives to lower effort to increase fees, even in the one-shot game.18 Hence, effort is here
14This asymmetry in the distribution of the signal greatly simplifies the analysis but is not essential.
What ultimately matters for our results is that the probability that a bad seller obtains certification
decreases with the certifier’s (expected) precision.
15The assumption that effort is costly is not essential, but makes the results cleaner, in that we
would obtain multiple equilibria if altering the precision of the signal was costless for the certifier.
16This is consistent with reports on how credit rating agencies have been adjusting the information
they provide to markets: rather than directly manipulating the outcome of their credit risk models
-the rating itself- they adjust their models or the type of information inputed into these models (see,
e.g., SEC (2008)).
17z is irrelevant in the monopoly case and can be though as being equal to 1, but will prove useful
once we introduce multiple certifiers. See section ??.
18One of the sharpest criticisms following the subprime crisis was that part of rating agencies’ fees
were indeed contingent on a favourable rating. During the Summer 2008, an agreement was found
between the New York State General Attorney Andrew Cuomo and the three main credit rating
agencies, which required that rating fees be charged upfront.
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purely driven by long-term reputational concerns. Note also that we take the fee, zφ,
to be exogenous. The question of the optimal structure of the market for certification
services has been extensively studied, for instance in Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache, and
Quesada (2009) or Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012). These papers have shown that
the pricing structure of certification, as well as the identity the party that purchases
certification services influence both the composition of the market for certification and
certifiers’ incentives to manipulate information. Incorporating these effects into our
model would compromise its tractability, while our objective is to insulate the impact
of reputation on the ability of the certifier to attract sellers. Implicitly, we therefore
assume that certification fees are somewhat rigid and cannot be adjusted to changes
in the certifier’s reputation. A consequence is that the certifier’s profit is proportional
to the total demand for certification.
2.3 Timeline
We conclude this description of the model with the timing of the game. There are two
periods; the seller and the buyers only live one period, while the certifier is long-lived
with a discount factor normalized to 1. Within each period t, the game unfolds as
follows:
a. The seller observes the quality θt of his product and decides whether to solicit
certification.
b. The certifier exerts effort et and produces a signal σt.
c. Buyers observe σt and independently submit bids for the product in a second-
price auction.
We assume that the certifier does not have private information on α. In the be-
ginning of period 1, all players share the common belief that Pr(α = αH) = ρ1. If
certification takes place in period 1, all the players present in period 2 observe both
the certification outcome σ1 and the quality of the product θ1 in the previous period.
We denote ρ2 = Pr(α = αH |σ1, θ1) and will henceforth refer to ρt as the certifier’s
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reputation in period t. A feature of our game is that no realization of (σ1, θ1) is ever
out of the equilibrium path, which results in all players sharing the same beliefs all
along the game.
3 Two-sided reputation: the monopoly case
3.1 The costs and benefits of reputation
We first analyze the final period (t = 2), in which there are no reputation-building
concerns. At stage 2b., the certifier exerts zero effort and the precision of its signal
is fully determined by the technology α. The expected probability at t = 2 that a
bad-type seller θb obtains a favourable rating (σ2 = ∅) given ρ2 is
q2 ≡ Pr(σ = ∅|θ = θb) = 1− [ρ2αH + (1− ρ2)αL]
q2 measures the certifier’s perceived precision at t = 2; it decreases from 1 − αL to
1− αH as ρ2 increases from 0 to 1. We first characterize the period 2 equilibrium as a
function of q2, and then derive the expression of the certifier’s profit as a function of
ρ2.
A market equilibrium features a cutoff type λ2 ∈ [0, 1] such that a good seller with
reservation value λ solicits certification if and only if λ ≤ λ2, a probability γ2 that a bad
seller solicits certification, and a price P2 that the seller obtains following certification,
i.e. a report σ = ∅.19 Before we characterize the equilibrium with certification, note
that there always exists a no-certification equilibrium, (λ2 = γ2 = 0, P2 ≤ φ). This
equilibrium is sustained by any distribution of buyers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs which
results in a price smaller than φ. We rule out this equilibrium and focus instead on
the equilibrium where trade occurs with positive probability. Consider a candidate
equilibrium (λ2, γ2, P2). Since buyers are competitive, risk neutral, and have identical
19Since buyers are competitive, risk neutral and hold the same beliefs in equilibrium, they bid up
to the expected value of the good. Therefore, it is indifferent to consider the transaction price P2
or Bayesian posterior beliefs as a component of the Bayesian equilibrium. Note also that there is no
transaction following a bad report σ2 = b, as it perfectly reveals that the product is of bad quality.
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information, the transaction price P2 when the product is certified (σ2 = ∅) is equal
to the expected value of the project:
P2 ≡ Pr(θ = θg|σ2 = ∅) = βF (λ2)
βF (λ2) + (1− β)γ2q2
∈ [0, 1].
A good seller with reservation value λ solicits certification iff P2 − φ ≥ λ. Since
P2 ≤ 1, a seller with value λ = 1 never solicits certification. If P2 ≤ φ, no seller ever
solicits certification (no-certification equilibrium). We assume that P2 > φ and will
check that it is true ex post.
Consider some q2 ∈ [1− αH , 1− αL]. If P2 > φ, (λ2, γ2, P2) must satisfy
P2 − λ2 = φ (1)
γ2 ∈ argmax
γ˜∈[0,1]
γ˜(q2P2 − φ) (2)
P2 =
βF (λ2)
βF (λ2) + (1− β)γ2q2
(3)
We immediately see that we indeed have P2 > φ : if γ2 = 0, then P2 = 1 > φ. If
γ2 ≥ 0, we must have P2 ≥ φq2 > φ.
Notice also that, since P2 is a decreasing function of γ2, the solution to (2) must be
unique.
We restrict attention to the case where γ2 ∈ (0, 1). This assumption is not essential
for our results but simplifies the analysis, as it ensures that the certifier’s profit function
is differentiable everywhere. Necessary conditions to obtain an interior solution are
Assumption 2. φ < 1− αH and β < β1 ≡ 1
1+ max
q2∈[1−αH,1−αL]
1
φ
(1− φ
q2
)F (
1−q2
q2
φ)
The first inequality states that the cost of certification for the seller is smaller than
the minimal probability for a bad seller to obtain certification. Therefore, the bad
seller is willing to solicit certification with positive probability for all q2. This also
implies that P < 1. The second inequality ensures that there are ex ante too many
bad types to sustain an equilibrium in which a bad seller always solicits certification
10
(see the proof of Lemma 1 to check how it kicks in as a necessary condition). Note
that this condition imposes the same type of constraint as Assumption 1, namely that
the adverse selection problem is severe. Under assumption 2, solving for the system
((1),(2),(3)) yields:
Lemma 1. For all q2 ∈ [1− αH , 1− αL], the period-2 equilibrium is such that:
λ2 =
1−q2
q2
φ
γ2 =
β
1−β (1− φq2 ) 1φF (
1−q2
q2
φ)
P2 =
φ
q2
Proof. Assuming γ2 interior, (2) implies P2 =
φ
q2
, which allows to derive λ2 and γ2.
Assumption 2 ensures that 0 < γ2 < 1. Since we have established uniqueness of the
equilibrium, this is the only possible solution of the system involving certification.
Since the certifier charges a fixed fee zφ, his expected profit in period 2 is given by
pi2 ≡ [βF (λ2) + (1− β)γ2]zφ = βz(1− 1− q2
q2
φ)F (
1− q2
q2
φ). (4)
Note that 1−q2
q2
is a measure of the certifier’s (perceived) precision at the beginning
of period 2, ρ2. It is then apparent from the expression in (4) that the impact of a
change in precision on the certifier’s profit pi2 is potentially ambiguous. Intuitively, a
higher expected precision has two effects: (a) the probability of obtaining certification
decreases for bad sellers, while it is unchanged for good sellers (q2 decreases); (b)
conditional on certification, buyers are willing to pay a higher price (P2 increases).
Hence, a higher reputation for transparency unambiguously raises participation of good
sellers (λ2 increases).
20 As for bad sellers, the impact of precision is unclear. On the
one hand, the price conditional on certification is higher both because the signal is more
precise, and because good types are more likely to participate. This tends to increase
the participation of bad types. But on the other hand, the probability of certification is
lower, which decreases their incentive to participate. Which of these effects dominate
20Note that if a higher precision was also increasing the probability that good sellers are certified,
this effect would be magnified.
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depends on the shape of F and of the parameters of the model. We make the following
assumption:
Assumption 3. F ( αL
1−αLφ) ≤ (1−
αL
1−αLφ)f(
αL
1−αLφ) and F (
αH
1−αH φ) ≥ (1−
αH
1−αH φ)f(
αH
1−αH φ)
Rewriting pi2 as a function of ρ2 :
pi2(ρ2) = βz(1− ρ2αH + (1− ρ2)αL
1− [ρ2αH + (1− ρ2)αL]φ)F (
ρ2αH + (1− ρ2)αL
1− [ρ2αH + (1− ρ2)αL]φ),
we derive from Assumption 3 the following proposition:
Proposition 1. ∃ρ∗2 ∈ (0, 1), pi′2(ρ2) ≥ 0 on [0, ρ∗2] and pi′2(ρ2) ≤ 0 on [ρ∗2, 1]
Proof. In the Appendix.
Ρ2
Π@Ρ2D
Figure 1: The certifier’s profit in period 2
For low levels of precision (low ρ2, i.e. high q2), a higher reputation for accuracy
increases profit. Participation of good types increases, while bad types may participate
more or less. But, in any case, the probability that the bad seller solicits certification
decreases slower than the participation of the high type increases. However, for high
reputations, the probability for a bad type to be certified decreases and the bad seller’s
participation γ2 rate must drop. Assumption 3 states that this drop is too important to
be outweighed by the increase in good seller’s participation. Consequently, the overall
profit of the certifier decreases beyond a certain level of expected precision.
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Proposition 1 tells us that, under fairly simple conditions, reputation for accuracy is
essentially two-sided: while a good seller always prefers a more accurate certifier, a bad
seller would like the certifier to be neither too accurate nor too imprecise. This results
in total demand being maximized for a level of expected accuracy which is not the
maximal one: a certifier can be “too accurate”. In terms of reputational incentives, the
certifier would then like to develop a reputation for being more accurate when perceived
precision is low (ρ2 → 0). Conversely, a certifier with a high expected precision (ρ2 →
1), should aim at developing a reputation for being less accurate. Between this two
extremes, the model captures the two-sidedness of reputation. Therefore, the direction
of reputation incentives is essentially ambiguous and critically depends on the current
reputation of the certifier.
We close this subsection with a few comments on some features of the model. Notice
first that if assumption 3 was not verified, the certifier’s profit would be monotonic in its
reputation. Hence the analysis of reputational incentives would be essentially identical
to previous contributions on this topic (e.g., Benabou and Laroque, 1992 or Mathis,
McAndrews, and Rochet, 2009). Since the market for certification is essentially two-
sided, the analysis of reputation-building when reputational incentives are ambiguous
is warranted. Second, since the probability that good sellers are willing to participate
in the market is increasing in the precision of the certifier’s signal, total welfare is also
an increasing function of his reputation ρ2 (only good-quality products generate gains
from trade). The certifier does not internalize total welfare, and as a result, his profits
are maximized for intermediate values of his reputation. In the model, this is driven by
the assumption of a fixed price set ex-ante which prevents the certifier from screening
out bad types, for instance by offering menus of contracts and contingent payments.
However, any mechanism by which the certifier could extract rents from bad sellers
without jeopardizing too much his attractiveness to good sellers would qualitatively
generate the same effects.
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3.2 Reputation building
In period 2, given that the certifier has no reputational concerns, he picks the cost-
minimizing level of effort e∗2 = 0. However, the certifier has an incentive to try and
build a reputation in period 1 because the accuracy of his report conveys information
about his type α : following a bad report, the updated belief ρ2 that the certifier is the
accurate type αH is given by
ρ+(e1) ≡ ρ1(αH + e1)
ρ1αH + (1− ρ1)αL + e1 = ρ1 +
ρ1(1− ρ1)(αH − αL)
ρ1αH + (1− ρ1)αL + e1 ,
where e1 is the anticipated level of effort.
21 Conversely, a good report on a bad quality
product triggers an updating from ρ1 down to
ρ−(e1) ≡ ρ1(1− αH − e1)
1− ρ1αH − (1− ρ1)αL − e1 = ρ1 −
ρ1(1− ρ1)(αH − αL)
1− ρ1αH − (1− ρ1)αL − e1 .
Note that since good-quality products are certified with probability 1 regardless of the
certifier’s accuracy, observing a good product certified in period 1 is uninformative and
ρ2 = ρ1. However, conditional on the product being of bad quality, the certifier can
affect the probability that ρ2 = ρ
+,
[ρ1αH + (1− ρ1)αL] + e1 ≡ 1− q1(e1)
by adjusting his effort e1. Finally, the seller in period 1 decides about soliciting a rating
based on his anticipation of the effort e1. As in period 2, an equilibrium in period 1
features a cutoff type λ1(e1), the probability for a bad seller to solicit certification
γ1(e1), and a transaction price P1(e1).
λ1(e1) =
1− q1(e1)
q1(e1)
φ,
γ1(e1) ∈ argmax
γ˜∈[0,1]
γ˜ [q1(e1)P1(e1)− φ] ,
21In order to avoid heavy notation, we do not explicitly write the dependence of the posterior ρ2
on the prior ρ1, except in the Appendix.
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P1(e1) =
βF [λ1(e1)]
βF [λ1(e1)] + (1− β)γ1(e1)q1(e1)
.
Furthermore, buyers and sellers’ anticipation of e1 is correct in equilibrium and the
certifier chooses the effort level that maximizes his expected profit in period 2:
e∗1 ∈ argmax
e1
(1− β)γ1(e∗1)
βF
[
λ1(e∗1)
]
+ (1− β)γ1(e∗1)
{
[1− q(e1)]pi2[ρ+(e∗1)] + q(e1)pi2[ρ−(e∗1)]
}−ce21
2
(5)
Note that the seller’s decision in period 1 feeds back into the effort decision of the
certifier as it affects the probability that an application comes from a bad seller, hence
the probability that effort impacts reputation.
Proposition 2. For c sufficiently large, there is a unique equilibrium level of effort
given by a function e∗1(ρ1) and a threshold ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
• e∗1(ρ1) is continuous in ρ1,
• e∗1(0) = e∗1(1) = e∗1(ρ) = 0,
• e∗1(ρ1) > 0 for ρ1 ∈ (0; ρ),
• e∗1(ρ1) < 0 for ρ1 ∈ (ρ; 1).
Ρ1
e1
Figure 2: Equilibrium effort in period 1
Proof. In the Appendix.
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The assumption that c is large enough allows to ensure uniqueness of the equilib-
rium. A formal expression of the lower bound on c is given in the Appendix. Proposition
2 tells us that reputation can provide both good or bad incentives to produce infor-
mation: as compared to no-reputation case, reputational concerns result in a higher
precision in period 1 when ρ1 is low and, conversely, in lower precision when ρ1 is high:
the desire to build a reputation for accuracy leads a certifier perceived as insufficiently
accurate to increase effort so as to detect bad quality products more often; however,
a certifier perceived as “too accurate” needs to decrease precision in order to achieve
a more balanced reputation and attract more future bad sellers. The overall effect of
reputation-building on welfare is therefore ambiguous. Reputation has a disciplining
effect, as a certifier needs to build a certain level of credibility to attract good sellers,
which, in turn, makes certification attractive to bad sellers. However, there can also be
“bad reputation” effects, whereby the certifier lowers the precision of his signal relative
to a no-reputation benchmark, in an effort to cater to future bad sellers. Note that the
certifier’s incentives to manipulate the precision of his signal are purely driven by repu-
tation, that is, he has no short-term incentive to distort information production. This
contrasts with existing models of reputation of experts, such as Benabou and Laroque
(1992) or Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009), in which the intermediary trades off
long-term incentives to be truthful against short-term incentives to distort information
in order to reap immediate profits. In these models, the intermediary always prefers
being perceived as more accurate, but is at some point willing to milk his reputation to
enjoy higher current benefits. Hence, while reputation might not be enough to perfectly
discipline the certifier, there is more information transmission when the intermediary
cares about his reputation than when he does not. On the contrary, in our model,
for ρ1 > ρ, there is less information provided when the intermediary cares about his
reputation.
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4 Multiple certifiers: single- and multihoming.
In this section, we study how the entry of a second certifier affects reputational incen-
tives. Specifically, we assume that while certifier A is a monopoly in the first period, a
second certifier, B, enters the market in period 2 with a random reputation ρB2 drawn
form the uniform distribution on [0, 1].22 As in the monopoly case we assume that a
seller who apply for certification bears a cost (1 − z)φ and the each certifier charges
a fee zφ for its services. We contrast two market structures: in the first one (“sin-
glehoming”), the seller is constrained to solicit certification from one certifier only; in
the second (“multihoming”), a seller may solicit both certifiers. We show that allow-
ing for multihoming shifts reputational incentives and reverses the conclusions of the
singlehoming case.
4.1 Singlehoming
We start with the case where sellers are constrained to singlehome. We slightly modify
the timing to allow for the entry of a competitor in period 2. Specifically,
In period 1,
1a. The seller observes the quality θ of his product and decides to solicit certification
from A or not,
1b. If solicited, certifier A makes effort e1 and publishes the signal σ ∈ {∅, b} ,
1c. Buyers observe the signal and independently submit bids for the product.
In period 2,
2a. ρB2 is realized and observed by all parties.
2b. The seller observes the quality θ and of his product and decides to solicit certifi-
cation from A or from B,
22Our results would hold for any distribution. Randomness allows to smooth profit functions, it is
introduced only for technical reasons.
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2c. The certifier who have been sollicited chooses effort ej and publishes the signal
σj ∈ {∅, b} ,
2d. Buyers observe signals and independently submit bids for the product.
The key feature of the competition taking place in period 2 is that the certifier with
the highest reputation captures all the market. Letting ρjt denote the reputation of
certifier j ∈ {A,B} in period t, we formalize this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In period 2, the incumbent certifier A is active if and only if ρA2 > ρ
B
2 . In
this case, his profit is identical to the monopoly profit.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Good sellers exert a positive externality
on bad sellers: an increase in the participation of good sellers λ improves average
quality in the pool of applicants and hence incentives for bad sellers to participate. In
fact, the certifier cannot attract bad sellers unless he is able to attract good sellers.
Because good sellers have a preference for precision, they pick the certifier with the
highest reputation, which leaves the certifier with the lowest reputation inactive. This
dynamic is reminiscent of the literature on two-sided markets in which platforms have
a similar incentive to “cater” to the side of the market which exerts the strongest
positive externality on the other side.23 Note that the seller’s choice of a certifier at
t = 2 may in itself convey information to buyers. As a result, it is in principle possible
to sustain an equilibrium in which only the certifier with the lowest reputation is active.
However, this equilibrium relies on out-of-equilibrium beliefs which are ruled out by a
simple refinement criterion.
Lemma 2 implies that the incumbent looses the market whenever ρB2 > ρ
A
2 , which
happens with prior probability 1 − ρA2 . Therefore, the expected profit of the incum-
bent reads pish(ρA2 ) = ρ
A
2 pi(ρ
A
2 ). Turning to the period-1 choice of effort, we derive the
following result.
23See for instance Caillaud and Jullien (2003).
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Proposition 3. In the singlehoming case, competition mitigates bad reputation effects:
e∗1(ρ1) ≤ 0⇒ e∗1(ρ1) ≤ esh1 (ρ1)
Proof. In the Appendix
When sellers singlehome, competition lowers incentives for the certifier to pander
to bad types. Intuitively, the inefficiency in the monopoly case comes from the exces-
sive weight that the certifier put on bad sellers relative to good ones when trying to
optimize his reputation. Competition corrects in part this bias by increasing the value
of attracting good sellers. One can show that the function pish2 (ρ) = ρpi2(ρ) is either
nondecreasing or hump-shaped with a maximum reached at point strictly larger than
ρ∗2, the certifier’s bliss reputation under monopoly. As a result, the region in which
certifier A’s reputation is beyond his preferred value shrinks, or even disappear, and
within this region the net benefit of decreasing his perceived accuracy decreases. Note
however that the overall impact of competition is unclear for lower values of ρA1 as the
threat of being displaced has another effect on incentives to provide effort: it scales
down expected profits in period 2, which lowers the expected benefit from providing
effort.
4.2 Multihoming
In this subsection, we relax the constraint that sellers have to choose one certifier
and allow them to “multihome.” That is, every seller has the possibility to solicit
certification from both certifiers A and B. The timing of the game is identical to the
one in subsection 4.1, except that in period 2, the seller can now apply for certification
from certifier A, B or both (step 2.b). Note that multihoming is common practice in
the market for corporate credit ratings, where the overwhelming majority of large bond
issues are rated by both Moody’s and Standard & Poors (see, for instance, Bongaerts,
Cremers, and Goetzmann, 2012). We assume that the signals produced by certifiers A
and B are independently distributed conditional on product quality. This assumption
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is inessential -we only need that A’s signal is not a sufficient statistics for B’s signal and
vice versa- but simplifies the analysis. We also impose that the seller simultaneously
applies for ratings if he applies to more than one. Our results would hold if we allowed
for sequential applications, as long as applications are public. However, we abstract
from the issue of shopping, whereby can secretly ask for a rating and disclose it only
if it is good enough. (Rating shopping is studied in Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009, and
Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012.). Finally, to ensure interior solutions, we make the
following assumption, which is the counterpart of Assumption 2 in the monopoly case.
Assumption 4. φ(1 + z) < (1− αH)2 and β < φ(1+z)(1−αL)2φ(1+z)(1−αL)2+[(1−αL)2−φ(1+z)]F [1−φ(1+z)]
As in the previous cases, we start with the equilibrium of the certification market
in period 2, in which the following result obtains.
Lemma 3. The equilibrium is such that sellers either multihome, i.e. solicit certifica-
tion from both certifiers, or do not solicit certification at all.
Intuitively, an equilibrium in which only one certifier is active can only be sustained
by the out-of-equilibrium belief that a seller who deviates and apply for a second rating
has a sufficiently high probability of being a bad type. This belief is ruled out by a
simple refinement which attributes this type of deviation to the type who is more likely
to benefit from it, that is, a good-quality seller. This implies that the net increase in
price for a good-quality seller following a second rating is high enough to cover the cost
of this second rating, which makes the deviation profitable.24 Note that this result is
consistent with the empirical observation mentioned above that multi-rated issuances
are pervasive for corporate bonds (Bongaerts, Cremers, and Goetzmann, 2012). The
key consequence of Lemma 3 is that rather than generating competition, a market
structure in which multihoming is possible results in both certifiers sharing the same
pool of clients. In fact, the equilibrium is such that both certifiers enjoy the same level
of profit, regardless their respective reputations.
24Under assumption 4 the cost of an extra rating φz is bounded above.
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Lemma 4. For a given a realization ρB2 , both certifiers make the same period-2 profit:
p˜imh(ρA2 , ρ
2
B) = β
z
1 + z
[1− (1 + z)1− q
mh
2 (ρ
A
2 , ρ
B
2 )
qmh2 (ρ
A
2 , ρ
B
2 )
φ]F [(1 + z)
1− qmh2 (ρA2 , ρB2 )
qmh2 (ρ
A
2 , ρ
B
2 )
φ]
Viewed ex ante, certifier A’s continuation profit in period 2 reads
pimh(ρA2 ) =
∫ 1
0
p˜imh(ρA2 , ρ
B
2 ) dρ
B
2
Let ρ∗mh2 (ρB) the bliss reputation of certifier A given ρ
B
2 .
Proposition 4. If pi2 is hump-shaped, then pi2
mh(ρA2 , ρ
B
2 ) is either nonincreasing or
hump-shaped in ρA2 . Furthermore, ρ
∗mh
2 (ρ
B
2 ) < ρ
∗
2 and
∂ρ∗mh2 (ρ
B
2 )
∂ρB2
≤ 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Notice that
1−qmh”
qmh2
is the ratio between the probability for a bad seller of being un-
able to trade because of rejection and the probability that he trades. Because he faces
a tradeoff between the credibility of certification and the need to attract bad sellers
who fear they might not be able to trade, the certifier obtains a profit which is maxi-
mized for some interior value of this ratio, which corresponds to the profit-maximizing
“informativeness” of the overall certification process. When a second certifier is active
in the market, the other certifier can only compensate the additional information which
the latter generates by having himself a lower reputation. And the more reputable the
other certifier, the more so. The extra cost zφ has the additional effect of lowering the
bliss reputation of the certifier even further. Since zφ plays a screening role, it would
make high reputations less desirable even if no other certifier was providing additional
information. Note however, that even if that extra cost was vanishingly small, the
incumbent preferred reputation would still be lower than in the monopoly case.
As lower reputations become relatively more desirable to a certifier under multi-
homing than under a monopoly, reputational concerns could, in turn, adversely impact
information production in period 1. We assume for simplicity that certifiers submit
their ratings simultaneously, meaning that a certifier cannot learn about the type of
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the other by observing his action before disclosing his own rating. We also make the
extra assumption that (1− x)F (x) is concave.25
Proposition 5. Multihoming exacerbates bad reputation effects,
e∗1(ρ1) ≤ 0⇒ emh1 (ρ1) ≤ e∗1(ρ1).
Proof. In the Appendix.
When sellers can multihome, the entry of a second certifier has the opposite effect
as exclusive competition (singlehoming). Because certifiers do not compete to attract
sellers but instead share the same customer base, a reputation for accuracy becomes
less valuable than in the monopoly case. Certifiers exert an externality on each other:
the more reputable the competitor, the less valuable a good reputation is. This exacer-
bates bad reputation effects: when reputation for accuracy is high enough to generate
a negative effort for a monopolist, then the prospect of entry threat provides further
incentives to decrease effort. Note that we have assumed, for simplicity, that competi-
tion only takes place in period 2, which makes the analysis of period 1 more tractable.
If there were two competitors in both periods, the welfare impact of multihoming in
period 1 would then be ambiguous: (a) on the one hand, multihoming lowers incen-
tives to exert effort, which adversely impacts welfare; (b) on the other hand, more
information is conveyed because the entrant produces an extra signal.
5 Conclusion
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a compelling need for efficient certifica-
tion: technologies become more complex, market participants are more sophisticated,
which increases the scope for information asymmetries; there has been an increasing
demand for green or fair trade products. All these evolutions tie in with a more in-
fluential role for certifiers. Furthermore, externalities create a need for regulation, as
25This is true for instance if the density f is nonincreasing.
22
in financial markets for instance. A few certification intermediaries may accordingly
end up exerting a considerable influence on the allocation of resources in the whole
economy. In the same time, recent years have witnessed one of the most dramatic
failures in the certification industry: rating agencies have massively failed to predict
the subprime crisis and have instead played an important role by overrating structured
securities. The question of the ability and incentives of certifiers to generate and trans-
mit accurate information is therefore absolutely critical. In this paper, we investigate
the role of reputation as an incentive mechanism for information production. We argue
that reputation in certification markets is essentially two-sided, in that the reputation
that certifiers ideally would like to achieve is not always a reputation for providing
high-quality information. Therefore, reputation may provide wrong incentives, if the
certifier cares about developing a reputation for being imprecise, which we show hap-
pens when he is perceived as “too accurate”. Furthermore, the presence of multiple
certifiers sometimes exacerbates these inefficiencies due to wrong incentives.
Our paper offers several possibilities of extension in different directions. First, we
abstract from the issue of optimal pricing by certifiers in order to insulate the impact of
reputation on the certifier’s profit. While assuming some rigidity in prices (i.e., prices
cannot instantly adjust to changes in reputation) seems a reasonable assumption in the
short run, it would be interesting to study how pricing interacts with reputation, in a
context where a certifier tries to attract different types of applicants. In particular, the
interplay between reputation and competition is particularly promising. Second, the
idea that reputation is multi-sided, in that it reflects the desire to attract different pools
of customers, could generate new interesting insights on other markets. In particular,
two-sided markets where a platform connects two types of agents (e.g., media, operating
systems) would constitute a natural application. Finally, the idea that reputation is
multi-sided could be related to the literature on multi-sided communication. In the
spirit of this literature, a very interesting question is whether a sender willing to build
a two-sided reputation should talk privately or publicly to each of his audiences.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Monopoly
Proof of Proposition 1 Let us define g(x) ≡ βz(1−x)F (x) and k(ρ) ≡ ραH+(1−ρ)αL
1−(ραH+(1−ρ)αL)φ.
Both functions F (x) and 1−x log-concave, so g(x) is also log-concave in x. Since g
is nonnegative on [0, 1], it is also quasi-concave on [0, 1]. k(ρ2) ∈ [0, 1] when ρ2 ∈ [0, 1]
and k′(ρ2) ≥ 0. Therefore, pi2(ρ2) = g[k(ρ2)] is quasi-concave in ρ2 on [0, 1].
pi′2(0) has the same sign as g
′(k(0)) = βz[(1− αL
1−αLφ)f(
αL
1−αLφ)− F (
αL
1−αLφ)] ≥ 0.
pi′2(1) has the sign of g
′(k(1)) = βz[(1− αH
1−αH φ)f(
αH
1−αH φ)− F (
αH
1−αH φ)] ≤ 0.
Because pi2 is quasi-concave, it cannot change monotonicities more than once. There-
fore, pi2 is a unimodal function: there is a unique ρ
∗
2 ∈ (0, 1) such pi′2(ρ∗2) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 First of all, let us make the extra assumption that γ1(e1) ∈
(0, 1) for all e1 ∈ [−, ]. Sufficient conditions for this are:
Assumption 5. φ < 1− αH −  and β < β′1 ≡ 11+ max
q1∈[1−αH−,1−αL+]
1
φ
(1− φ
q1
)F (
1−q1
q1
φ)
γ1 is interior, hence it equals
β
1−β (1− φq1 ) 1φF (
1−q1
q1
φ) (see the Proof of Lemma 1).
Therefore, we have (1−β)γ1
βF (λ1)+(1−β)γ1 =
q1−φ
q1−φ+φq1 .
Let us define the following function (where the dependence of q1, ρ
+ and ρ− on both
ρ1 and e1 is made explicit):
L(ρ1, e1) ≡ q1(ρ1, e1)− φ
q1(ρ1, e1)− φ+ φq1(ρ1, e1) [pi2(ρ
+(ρ1, e1))− pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e1))]− ce1
A solution to (5) is either e∗1 = − if L(ρ1,−) < 0, e∗1 =  if L(ρ1, ) > 0, or e∗1 such
that L(ρ1, e
∗
1) = 0.
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Let us assume that c is large enough such that sup
ρ1,e1
L2(ρ1, e1) < 0.
26 This ensures
that there is a unique solution e∗1 to (5) for all ρ1.
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Furthermore, L is continuously differentiable in each argument, so e∗1(ρ1) is contin-
uous in ρ1.
Consider ρ1 ∈ {0, 1} . ∀e1, ρ+(ρ1, e1) = ρ−(ρ1, e1) = ρ1, so L(ρ1, e1) = −ce1.
Therefore, we have e∗1(0) = e
∗
1(1) = 0.
By the implicit function theorem, when the solution to (5) is interior,
∂e∗1
∂ρ1
(ρ1) = −L1(ρ1, e
∗
1(ρ1))
L2(ρ1, e∗1(ρ1))
=
(αH−αL)φ2
[q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ+φq1(ρ1,e∗1)]2 [pi2(ρ
+(ρ1, e
∗
1))− pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e∗1))]
L2(ρ1, e∗1)
−
q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ
q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ+φq1(ρ1,e∗1)
{
pi′2[ρ
+(ρ1, e
∗(ρ1))]
∂ρ+
∂ρ1
(ρ1, e
∗(ρ1))− pi′2[ρ−(ρ1, e∗(ρ1))]∂ρ
−
∂ρ1
(ρ1, e
∗(ρ1))
}
L2(ρ1, e∗1)
We have:
∂ρ+
∂ρ1
(ρ1, e1) =
(αH + e1)(αL + e1)
[ρ1αH + (1− ρ1)αL + e1]2 ≥ 0
and
∂ρ−
∂ρ1
(ρ1, e1) =
(1− αH − e1)(1− αL − e1)
[ρ1(1− αH) + (1− ρ1)(1− αL)− e1]2 ≥ 0.
This implies, recalling that e∗1(0) = e
∗
1(1) = 0 and that L2(ρ1, e
∗
1(ρ1))) < 0 :
• ∂e∗1
∂ρ1
(0) has the sign of pi′2(0)[
αH
αL
− 1−αH
1−αL ], i.e. is nonnegative.
• ∂e∗1
∂ρ1
(1) has the sign of pi′2(1)[
αL
αH
− 1−αL
1−αH ], i.e. is nonnegative.
By continuity of e∗1(ρ1) and from e
∗
1(0) = e
∗
1(1) = 0, there exists at least a ρ such
that e∗1(ρ) = 0.
26Li(., .) refers to the partial derivative of L with respect to the i-th variable.
27This assumption is sufficient to get uniqueness, but not necessary. It is indeed enough that
L(ρ1, e1) = 0 ⇒ L2(ρ1, e1) < 0 but since a solution to L(ρ1, e1) = 0 can only be defined implicitly,
this is much more cumbersome to write.
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ρ is such that L(ρ, 0) = 0, which is equivalent to
pi2[ρ
+(ρ, 0)] = pi2[ρ
−(ρ, 0)]
ρ+(ρ, 0) 6= ρ−(ρ, 0) because ρ /∈ {0, 1} , so the single-peakedness of pi2 implies that
pi′2[ρ
+(ρ, 0)] < 0 < pi′2[ρ
−(ρ, 0)]
We derive that
∂e∗1
∂ρ1
(ρ) = −
q1(ρ,0)−φ
q1(ρ,0)−φ+φq1(ρ,0)
{
pi′2[ρ
+(ρ, 0)]∂ρ
+
∂ρ1
(ρ, 0)− pi′2[ρ−(ρ, 0)]∂ρ
−
∂ρ1
(ρ, 0)
}
L2(ρ, 0)
< 0.
Therefore, by continuity of e∗1(ρ1), ρ must be unique. From uniqueness of ρ and from
∂e∗
∂ρ1
(ρ) < 0, we derive that e∗1(ρ1) > 0 for ρ1 ∈ (0; ρ) and e∗1(ρ1) < 0 for ρ1 ∈ (ρ; 1).
6.2 Singlehoming
Proof of Lemma 2 Let denote by Pj(j = A,B) the price that a seller obtains
following certification from certifier j. Furthermore, let us specify as a refinement that,
whenever Bayes’ rule cannot apply, the posterior belief following a deviation is such
that all the weight is put on the type most likely to deviate. More precisely, suppose
Pj cannot be derived from Bayes’ rule. A good seller deviates from i to j if Pj > Pi,
while a bad seller deviates if (1− ρj2αH − (1− ρj2)αL)Pj > (1− ρi2αH − (1− ρi2)αL)Pi.
Therefore, the set of Pj for which a good seller deviates is a subset (resp. superset)
of the set of Pj for which a bad seller deviates if ρ
i
2 > ρ
j
2 (resp. ρ
i
2 < ρ
j
2). We impose
that a deviation from the more reputable to the less reputable certifier comes from a
bad seller, while a deviation in the opposite direction comes from a good seller. This
adaptation of the D1 criterion allows to rule unnatural equilibria where good sellers
have to solicit the less reputable certifier.28
28Notice that the D1 refinement does not apply strictly speaking, because we have a continuum of
types.
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If ρA2 = ρ
B
2 , let us assume that all seller types go to A. This assumption is innocuous,
as ρA2 = ρ
B
2 is a zero probability event. If ρ
A
2 6= ρB2 , suppose w.l.o.g. that ρA2 > ρB2 . Let
us consider different cases:
• PA < PB : this implies that no good seller ever goes to A. Therefore, PA cannot
be pinned down by Bayes’ rule. Since ρA2 > ρ
B
2 , our refinement imposes that
PA = 1, which violates PA < PB.
• PA = PB = 1 : this is impossible, as a low-quality seller would then have, from
Assumption 2, an incentive to solicit, say, A, which is inconsistent with PA = 1.
• PA = PB < 1 : then good sellers are indifferent between A and B. But, since
ρA2 > ρ
B
2 , bad sellers must prefer strictly B to A, so PA should be equal to 1.
Therefore, we must have PA > PB. This implies that no good seller ever goes to
B, hence no bad seller either. PB cannot be pinned down by Bayes’ rule, and our
refinement imposes PB = 0. All the sellers who solicit certification then go to A and
the price PA is then determined as in the monopoly case.
Proof of Proposition 3 Let us define
Lsh(ρ1, e1) ≡ q1(ρ1, e1)− φ
q1(ρ1, e1)− φ+ φq1(ρ1, e1) [ρ
+(ρ1, e1)pi2(ρ
+(ρ1, e1))−ρ−(ρ1, e1)pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e1))]−ce1.
A solution to the incumbent’s problem is either esh1 = − if Lsh(ρ1,−) < 0, esh1 = 
if Lsh(ρ1, ) > 0, or e
sh
1 such that L
sh(ρ1, e
sh
1 ) = 0. As in the monopoly case, we impose
that c is large enough, so that ∂L
sh
∂e1
(ρ1, e1) < 0. This ensures the uniqueness of e
sh
1 .
If e∗1 = −, the result is obvious. If − < e∗1 ≤ 0, e∗1 is defined by
L(ρ1, e
∗
1) =
q1(ρ1, e
∗
1)− φ
q1(ρ1, e∗1)− φ+ φq1(ρ1, e∗1)
[pi2(ρ
+(ρ1, e
∗
1))− pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e∗1))]− ce∗1 = 0
Lsh(ρ1, e
∗
1) =
q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ
q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ+φq1(ρ1,e∗1) [ρ
+(ρ1, e
∗
1)pi2(ρ
+(ρ1, e
∗
1))−ρ−(ρ1, e∗1)pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e∗1))]−ce∗1
=
q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ
q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ+φq1(ρ1,e∗1) [(1− ρ
−(ρ1, e∗1))pi2(ρ
−(ρ1, e∗1))− (1− ρ+(ρ1, e∗1))pi2(ρ+(ρ1, e∗1))]
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Furthermore, e∗1 ≤ 0⇔ pi2(ρ+(ρ1, e∗1)) ≤ pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e∗1)).
Since
q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ
q1(ρ1,e∗1)−φ+φq1(ρ1,e∗1) > 0, we have:
Lsh(ρ1, e
∗
1) ≥ [ρ+(ρ1, e∗1)− ρ−(ρ1, e∗1)]pi2(ρ+(ρ1, e∗1)) ≥ 0.
Finally, from ∂L
sh
∂e1
(ρ1, e1) < 0, we derive e
∗
1 ≤ esh1 .
6.3 Multihoming
Proof of Lemma 3 Let PAB, PA and PB the prices that buyers are willing to pay
following certification by both A and B, A only, and B only. Suppose furthermore that
ρA ≥ ρB.
• Consider an equilibrium in which no seller multihomes. For simplicity, assume
that the seller never goes to B (the proof is unchanged if no one goes to A or if
the seller randomizes, in the case ρA2 = ρ
B
2 ). From Assumption 2, we know that
there is neither zero nor full participation of bad sellers. Therefore, PA is given
by the indifference condition of bad sellers: PA =
φ
1−ρAαH−(1−ρA)αL . PAB and PB
cannot be derived from Bayes’ rule. Our refinement imposes that PAB be set to
1, as good sellers always have stronger incentives to deviate to multihoming than
bad sellers.
In order for such an equilibrium to exist, we must therefore have 1 < PA + zφ.
Since PA + zφ ≤ φ1−αH + zφ, and φ ≤
(1−αH)2
1+z
(from Assumption 6), we conclude:
PA + zφ ≤ 1− αH − zαH(1−αH)1+z < 1.
This establishes that a good seller who solicits A only should deviate and solicit
an extra rating.
If PA cannot be pinned down by Bayes’ rule but PB can, the result is a fortiori
true because ρA ≥ ρB, so incentives to deviate are even bigger.
This proves that there is no equilibrium with no multihoming.
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• Suppose now that there is both singlehoming and multihoming in equilibrium. A
good seller must then be indifferent between multihoming and singlehoming, say
with A only. Then, the bad seller strictly prefers to singlehome, so we must have
PAB = 1. The indifference condition for the good seller thus reads PA = 1− zφ,
which is impossible under Assumption 6.
Therefore, the good seller multihomes with probability 1, and singlehoming does
not occur in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4 As in the monopoly case, an equilibrium features a triple
(λ
mh
2 , γ
mh
2 , P
mh
2 ). Consider some q
mh
2 ∈ [(1 − αH)2, (1 − αL)2]. If Pmh2 > (1 + z)φ,
we must have:29
Pmh2 − λ
mh
2 = (1 + z)φ (6)
γmh2 ∈ argmax
γ˜∈[0,1]
γ˜[qmh2
βF (λ
mh
2 )
βF (λ
mh
2 ) + (1− β)γmh2 qmh2
− (1 + z)φ] (7)
Pmh2 = Pr(θ = θg|σA = σB = ∅) =
βF (λ
mh
2 )
βF (λ
mh
2 ) + (1− β)γmh2 qmh2
. (8)
The solution of this system must be unique, as Pmh2 is a decreasing function of γ
mh
2 .
Furthermore, at any solution involving certification with positive probability, we have
Pmh2 > (1+z)φ, so λ
mh
2 > 0. Again, we restrict attention to the case where γ
mh
2 ∈ (0, 1).
For all qmh2 ∈ [(1− αH)2, (1− αL)2], the interior solution is:
λ
mh
2 =
1−qmh2
qmh2
(1 + z)φ
γmh2 =
β
1−β (
1
1+z
− φ
qmh2
) 1
φ
F (
1−qmh2
qmh2
(1 + z)φ)
Pmh2 =
φ
qmh2
Necessary conditions for the solution to be interior are:
Assumption 6. φ(1 + z) < (1− αH)2
Assumption 7. β < 1
1+ max
qmh∈[(1−αH )2,(1−αL)2]
1
φ
( 1
1+z
− φ
qmh
)F ( 1−q
mh
qmh
(1+z)φ)
29Notice that we rule out again the equilibrium in which λ
mh
2 = γ
mh
2 = 0, so that we can always
apply Bayes’ rule to pin down Pmh2 .
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Assumptions 6 and 7 are the counterpart of Assumption 2 for multihoming. The
former ensures that the minimal joint probability of being certified by two different
certifiers is high enough, so that the demand of low quality sellers is always positive.
The latter allows to make sure that there is never full participation of low-quality
sellers.
We conclude by computing the profit as a function of qmh2 :
pimh2 (q
mh
2 ) = [βF (λ
mh
2 )+(1−β)γmh2 ]zφ = β
z
1 + z
[1−1− q
mh
2
qmh2
(1+z)φ]F [
1− qmh2
qmh2
(1+z)φ].
Proof of Proposition 4
Some notation and preliminary computations In order to compare the profits
under monopoly and multihoming, let us first define t(x, ρB2 ) ≡ (1+z)x+(ρ
B
2 αH+(1−ρB2 )αL)φ
1−(ρB2 αH+(1−ρB2 )αL)
.
Recalling that
g(x) = βz(1− x)F (x),
k(ρ) =
ραH + (1− ρ)αL
1− (ραH + (1− ρ)αL)φ,
qmh2 (ρ
A
2 , ρ
B
2 ) = [1− (ρA2 αH + (1− ρA2 )αL)][1− (ρB2 αH + (1− ρ2B)αL)],
one rewrites
pi2(ρ2) = g[k(ρ2)]
p˜imh2 (ρ
A
2 , ρ
B
2 ) =
1
1 + z
g[t(k(ρA2 ), ρ
B
2 )].
Proof. We have established that g(.) is quasi-concave on [0, 1]. Furthermore, t(k(ρA2 ), ρ
B
2 ) =
1−qmh2
qmh2
(1 + z)φ ∈ [0, 1] from Assumption 6. Finally, from k′(ρ) ≥ 0 and t1(., .) ≥ 0, we
derive that p˜imh2 (ρ
A
2 , ρ
B
2 ) is quasi-concave in ρ
A
2 .
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By definition of ρ∗2, we have g
′(k(ρ∗2)) = 0.
∂pimh2
∂ρA2
(ρ∗2, ρ
B
2 ) =
1
1 + z
g′[t(k(ρ∗2), ρ
B
2 )]t1(k(ρ
∗
2), ρ
B
2 )k
′(ρ∗2).
30ti(x, ρ
B
2 ) refers to the partial derivative of t with respect to the i-th variable.
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This expression is negative since t(x, ρB2 ) > x for all (x, ρ
B
2 ) and g
′(x) < 0 for x ≥ k(ρ∗2).
This implies that ρ∗mh2 (ρ
B
2 ) < ρ
∗
2 for all ρ
B
2 .
If ρ∗mh2 > 0, we have
∂pimh2
∂ρA2
(ρ∗mh2 , ρ
B
2 ) =
1
1 + z
g′[t(k(ρ∗mh2 ), ρ
B
2 )]t1(k(ρ
∗mh
2 ), ρ
B
2 )k
′(ρ∗mh2 ) = 0.
Since t1 and k
′ are positive and g is unimodal, we derive that t(k(ρ∗mh2 ), ρ
B
2 ) is equal
to some constant (actually k(ρ∗2)). It follows that
∂ρ∗mh2 (ρ
B
2 )
∂ρB2
= − t2(k(ρ
∗mh
2 ), ρ
B
2 )
t1(k(ρ∗mh2 ), ρ
B
2 )k
′(ρ∗mh2 )
.
Finally, t2(., .) > 0 implies that
∂ρ∗mh2 (ρ
B
2 )
∂ρB2
≤ 0. ρ∗mh2 = 0 is possible only if ρB2 is
large enough.
Proof of Proposition 5 Let us first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5. The following implication holds:
pi2(ρ
+(ρ1, e1)) ≤ pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e1))⇒ pimh2 (ρ+(ρ1, e1))−pimh2 (ρ−(ρ1, e1)) ≤ pi2(ρ+(ρ1, e1))−pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e1)).
Proof. Using the notation introduced earlier, we have
pimh2 (ρ) =
1
1 + z
∫ 1
0
g[t(k(ρ), ρB2 )] dρ
B
2 and pi2(ρ) = g[k(ρ)].
Dropping arguments of ρ+ and ρ−, one writes
pimh2 (ρ
+(ρ1, e1))− pimh2 (ρ−(ρ1, e1))− [pi2(ρ+(ρ1, e1))− pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e1))]
=
1
1 + z
[
∫ 1
0
g[t(k(ρ+), ρB2 )]− g[t(k(ρ−), ρB2 )] dρB2 − [g[k(ρ+)]− g[k(ρ−)]].
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One notices first that
1
1 + z
[
∫ 1
0
g[t(k(ρ+), ρB2 )]− g[t(k(ρ−), ρB2 )] dρB2
=
1
1 + z
∫ 1
0
∫ k(ρ+)
k(ρ−)
g′(t(s, ρB2 ))t1(s, ρ
B
2 ) ds dρ
B
2
=
∫ 1
0
1
1− (ρB2 αH + (1− ρB2 )αL)
∫ k(ρ+)
k(ρ−)
g′(t(s, ρB2 )) ds dρ
B
2 .
Finally, we derive
pimh2 (ρ
+)− pimh2 (ρ−)− [pi2(ρ+)− pi2(ρ−)]
=
∫ 1
0
1
1−(ρB2 αH+(1−ρB2 )αL)
{∫ k(ρ+)
k(ρ−) [g
′(t(s, ρB2 ))− g′(s)] ds+ (ρB2 αH + (1− ρB2 )αL)[g(k(ρ+)− g(k(ρ−))]
}
dρB2
Given that ρ+ ≥ ρ−, we have k(ρ+) ≥ k(ρ−).
Furthermore, t(s, ρB2 ) = (1 + z)
s+(ρB2 αH+(1−ρB2 )αL)φ
1−(ρB2 αH+(1−ρB2 )αL)
> s for all ρB2 .
Since g is concave, we derive that
∫ k(ρ+)
k(ρ−) [g
′(t(s, ρB2 ))− g′(s)] ds ≤ 0.
It follows that
pi2(ρ
+)− pi2(ρ−) ≤ 0⇒ pimh2 (ρ+)− pimh2 (ρ−)− [pi2(ρ+)− pi2(ρ−)] ≤ 0.
We now turn to the Proof of Proposition 5. Let us define
Lmh(ρ1, e1) ≡ q1(ρ1, e1)− φ
q1(ρ1, e1)− φ+ φq1(ρ1, e1) [pi
mh
2 (ρ
+(ρ1, e1))− pimh2 (ρ−(ρ1, e1))]− ce1
A solution to the incumbent’s problem is either emh1 = − if Lmh(ρ1,−) < 0,
emh1 =  if L
mh(ρ1, ) > 0, or e
mh
1 such that L
mh(ρ1, e
mh
1 ) = 0. As usual, we impose that
c is large enough, so that ∂L
mh
∂e1
(ρ1, e1) < 0. This ensures the uniqueness of e
mh
1 .
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If − < e∗1 ≤ 0, e∗1 is defined by
L(ρ1, e
∗
1) =
q1(ρ1, e
∗
1)− φ
q1(ρ1, e∗1)− φ+ φq1(ρ1, e∗1)
[pi2(ρ
+(ρ1, e
∗
1))− pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e∗1))]− ce∗1 = 0
In order to compare e∗1 and e
mh
1 , let us derive L
mh(ρ1, e
∗
1) :
Lmh(ρ1, e
∗
1) =
q1(ρ1, e
∗
1)− φ
q1(ρ1, e∗1)− φ+ φq1(ρ1, e∗1)
[pimh2 (ρ
+(ρ1, e
∗
1))− pimh2 (ρ−(ρ1, e∗1))]− ce∗1
=
q1(ρ1, e
∗
1)− φ
q1(ρ1, e∗1)− φ+ φq1(ρ1, e∗1)
[pimh2 (ρ
+(ρ1, e
∗
1))−pimh2 (ρ−(ρ1, e∗1))−(pi2(ρ+(ρ1, e∗1))−pi2(ρ−(ρ1, e∗1)))].
From Lemma 5, we have e∗1 ≤ 0, Lmh(ρ1, e∗1) ≤ 0. We conclude from ∂L
mh
∂e1
(ρ1, e1) < 0
that
− < e∗1 ≤ 0⇒ emh1 ≤ e∗1.
Suppose that e∗1 = −. We must therefore have
q1(ρ1,−)− φ
q1(ρ1,−)− φ+ φq1(ρ1,−) [pi2(ρ
+(ρ1,−))− pi2(ρ−(ρ1,−))] + c < 0.
From Lemma 5, we have
pimh2 (ρ
+(ρ1,−))− pimh2 (ρ−(ρ1,−)) ≤ pi2(ρ+(ρ1,−))− pi2(ρ−(ρ1,−))
We conclude that
q1(ρ1,−)− φ
q1(ρ1,−)− φ+ φq1(ρ1,−) [pi
mh
2 (ρ
+(ρ1,−))− pimh2 (ρ−(ρ1,−))] < −c,
which implies that emh1 = −.
Finally,
e∗1 ≤ 0⇒ emh1 ≤ e∗1.

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